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Key Findings 
 
 Risk assessments conducted 
in Africa and Indonesia, by 
identifying practices 
associated with higher risk of 
introduction or spread of 
HPAI, can inform  
recommendations for 
mitigation strategies. 
 In countries included in the 
study, the risk of HPAI 
introduction or spread 
between production sectors 
was assessed as negligible to 
medium, as a reflection of 
the estimated prevalence of 
HPAI, and not because of the 
presence of rigorous control 
measures. 
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From 2006 to the present, 11 countries in Africa reported outbreaks 
of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1: Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, 
Niger, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and 
Cameroon. Other than Egypt, where the disease is endemic, the last 
cases of HPAI H5N1 in Africa reported to the World Organization for 
Animal Health (OIE) occurred in Nigeria (June and July 2008) and Togo 
(September 2008). In Indonesia, the disease has become endemic since 
its introduction in 2004. 
Qualitative risk assessment is the most common type of assessment to 
guide routine decisionmaking, especially in data-scarce environments. It 
allows for the development of risk mitigation strategies and for the 
identification of data gaps, and provides useful recommendations for 
future research. 
A joint research team from the Royal Veterinary College (RVC) in London 
and International Livestock Research institute (ILRI) in Nairobi led five 
qualitative risk assessments in Ghana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and 
Indonesia between October 2008 and June 2009. The work was carried 
out by national collaborators: Paa Kobina Turkson (Ghana), Bewket 
Siraw and Hassen Chaka (Ethiopia), Dennis Onkundi (Kenya), Garba 
Maina Ahmed (Nigeria), and Syafrison Idris and Maria F. Palupi 
(Indonesia).  In each of the five countries, a stakeholders workshop was 
held in October or November 2008. These workshops had three main 
objectives: to present the risk assessment objectives to the 
stakeholders; to define the risk questions of interest for each country; 
and to outline the risk pathways. Drawing on the workshop outcomes, 
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the risk assessments (RAs) were then conducted from January to April 2009. Given the scarcity of 
data in these environments, input data for the models were collected by expert opinion elicitation, 
with key informants responding to questionnaires. The RA reports are currently being finalized. 
 
Probability categories were attributed on a scale from negligible to very high (Table 1). In addition to 
the risk estimate, uncertainty was assessed and classified in three categories (Table 2). 
 
Table 1. Interpretation of probability categories used in the risk assessment 
Probability category Interpretation 
Negligible Event is so rare that it does not merit consideration 
Very low Event is very rare but cannot be excluded 
Low Event is rare but does occur 
Medium Event occurs regularly 
High Event occurs very often 
Very high Even occurs almost with certainty 
Adapted from: The EFSA journal. 2006. Migratory birds and their possible role in the spread of highly 
pathogenic avian influenza, p. 155. 
 
Table 2. Interpretation of uncertainty categories used in the risk assessment 
Uncertainty category Interpretation 
Low Solid and complete data available; strong evidence provided in 
multiple references; authors report similar conclusions 
Medium Some but no complete data available; evidence provided in small 
number of references; authors’ conclusions vary from one another 
High Scarce or no data available; evidence is from unpublished reports or 
based on observations or personal communication; authors report 
conclusions that vary considerably between them 
Adapted from: The EFSA journal. 2006. Migratory birds and their possible role in the spread of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza, p. 155. 
 
For the identified risk pathways, risk estimates were combined using the combination matrix 
presented in Table 3. When applicable, Table 4 was used to combine overall risk estimates of release 
and exposure assessments.  
 
Table 3. Combination matrix used to combine qualitative risk estimates 
  Parameter 2 /Exposure risk category 
P
aram
e
te
r 1
 / 
R
e
le
ase
 risk 
cate
go
ry 
 Negligible  Very Low Low Medium High Very High 
Very High N VL L M H VH 
High N VL L M H H 
Medium N VL VL L M M 
Low N N VL VL L L 
Very Low N N VL VL VL VL 
Negligible  N N N N N N 
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Table 4. Combination matrix to combine release, exposure, and consequence 
  Consequence/transmission risk category 
C
o
m
b
in
e
d
 re
le
ase
 an
d
 
e
xp
o
su
re
 risk cate
go
ry 
 Negligible  Very Low Low Medium High Very High 
Very High N VL L M H VH 
High N VL L M H VH 
Medium N VL L M H VH 
Low N VL VL L M H 
Very Low N N VL VL L M 
Negligible  N N N N N N 
Risk Questions 
 
The risk questions addressed for each country are listed below. The questions considered 
introduction of HPAI H5N1 in the country and/or disease spread between and within the different 
poultry sectors within the country.  
Risk questions for Ethiopia 
 What is the risk of introduction of HPAI H5N1 via legal and illegal trade of wild birds 
transiting in Ethiopia?  
 What is the probability that domestic poultry in Ethiopia will become infected by HPAI H5N1 
after the release of the virus by an infected traded wild bird transiting in Ethiopia? 
 What is the risk of transmission of HPAI H5N1 between large commercial poultry farms and 
small-scale poultry farms? 
Risk questions for Kenya 
 What is the risk or probability of transmission of HPAI H5N1 between sector 4 farms? 
 What is the risk or probability of transmission of HPAI H5N1 from sector 4 farms to sector 3 
farms? 
 What is the risk or probability of transmission of HPAI H5N1 from sector 3 farms to sector 4 
farms via sale of live birds in markets? 
Risk question for Ghana 
 What is the risk of re-introduction of HPAI H5N1 from neighboring countries (Burkina Faso, 
Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo) via cross-border trade involving live birds, poultry products, and 
fomites? 
Risk questions for Nigeria 
 What is the risk of transmission of HPAI H5N1 from backyard commercial farms to household 
free range poultry? 
 What is the risk of transmission of HPAI H5N1 from medium-scale commercial farms to 
household free range poultry? 
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Risk question for Indonesia 
 In the district and municipality of Bogor, what is the risk of transmission of HPAI H5N1 
infection between small-scale broiler farms? 
Risk Pathways 
 
Risk pathway diagrams were outlined for each risk question above. Two examples are presented 
below. 
Example of a release pathway (Ghana) 
The release pathway diagram for the risk of re-introduction of HPAI H5N1 from Côte d’Ivoire into 
Ghana via cross-border trade and movement of people and birds is presented in Figure 1. Large 
farms in Ghana were considered as the most important release pathway through the movements of 
live birds and day-old-chicks and through fomites (movement of traders, eggs, and egg trays). Small-
scale farms were also identified as a potential release pathway for HPAI H5N1 through feeds or raw 
materials and movements of poultry farm workers.  
Example of an exposure pathway (Ethiopia) 
The exposure pathway diagram presented in Figure 2 shows the risk to the local Ethiopian poultry 
population after the release of the virus by an infected wild bird transiting in Ethiopia. The local 
poultry population could be exposed to HPAI H5N1 through five pathways: vermin, resident wild 
birds, day-old-chicks transiting via the airport, staff handling birds at the airport, and direct contact 
with the imported wild birds.  
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Figure 1. Release pathway diagram for Ghana 
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Figure 2. Diagram of exposure pathways of HPAI H5N1 to the poultry population after the release of the 
virus by an infected wild bird trade transiting in Ethiopia 
 
 
Preliminary Results for the Pathway Examples 
Ghana 
The risk estimates for re-introduction of HPAI H5N1 into Ghana from Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, 
and via cross-border trade and movement of birds and people are presented in Table 5. The 
release pathway at highest risk was Côte d’Ivoire, with a risk ranging from “Negligible to Medium.” 
The release pathway at lowest risk was Togo, with a risk ranging from “Negligible to Very Low.” 
Overall, most pathways were estimated as ”Negligible” or ”Very Low” because the prevalence of 
the disease was estimated as “Negligible,” and not because control measures have been 
implemented. For that reason, in each risk pathway, emphasis should be on implementing 
preventive measures at high-risk points of HPAI H5N1 re-introduction. Additionally, the high level of 
uncertainty associated with the risk estimates underscores the lack of knowledge on the 
epidemiology of HPAI H5N1 in Ghana and surrounding countries. 
 
Table 5: Preliminary summary conclusions for the qualitative risk assessment in Ghana 
Risk Pathway Probability Uncertainty 
Risk of re-introduction of HPAI H5N1 virus from 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Negligible to medium High 
Risk of re-introduction of HPAI H5N1 virus from 
Burkina Faso  
Negligible to low High 
Risk of re-introduction of HPAI H5N1 virus from 
Togo 
Negligible to very low High 
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Ethiopia 
 
The probability that domestic poultry in Ethiopia will become infected by HPAI H5N1 after the 
release of the virus by an infected wild bird on trade transit was estimated as “Low to Medium” with 
a ”Medium” uncertainty. The uncertainty was estimated “Medium” partly because of lack of 
information on all species of resident wild birds living around the airport, their susceptibility, and 
virus shading behavior.  
 
Preliminary analysis suggests that the most important risk factors in the exposure pathways are the 
lack of appropriate holding facilities for resident wild birds and contaminated staff attending the 
transit wild birds at the airport and owning poultry. The stratification of this risk scenario by the five 
identified exposure pathways will allow the development of tailored prevention measures.   
Discussion  
In most RAs, the majority of risk pathways were estimated as ”Negligible” or ”Very Low to Medium” 
because the prevalence of the virus was estimated “Negligible” or “Low” and not because control 
measures were implemented. However, practices associated with high risk of introduction and 
spread of HPAI H5N1 were identified, and recommendations for preventive or control measures 
drawn accordingly.  
 
 
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this report are those of the author(s) and are not necessarily endorsed by 
representatives of IFPRI or ILRI, or of the co-sponsoring or supporting organizations. This brief is intended for 
discussion only and has not been peer reviewed.  
For more information visit: www.hpai-research.net 
 
